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ADS-B:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast 
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FAF:  Final Approach Fix 
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GPS:  Global Positioning System 
HVO:  Higher Volume Operations 
IAF:  Initial Approach Fix 
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IMC:  Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
LEN:  Lateral Entry Notification 
MAHF:  Missed Approach Holding Fix 
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MAP:  Missed Approach Point 
MFD:  Multi-Function Display 
NAP:   Nominal Approach Path 
NAS:  National Airspace System 
PA:  Pilot-Advisor 
PFD:  Primary Flight Display 
RCO:  Remote Communications Outlet 
SATS:  Small Aircraft Transportation System 
SCA:  Self-Controlled Area 
TTA:  Time To Approach 
VEN:  Vertical Entry Notification 
VFR:  Visual Flight Rules 
VOR:  Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range 
 
  
Abstract 
This document defines the Small Aircraft Transportation System 
(SATS) Higher Volume Operations concept which is aimed at increasing 
the potential rate of flight operations during poor weather at our smaller 
airports. The general philosophy underlying this concept is the 
establishment of a newly defined area of flight operations called a Self-
Controlled Area (SCA). During periods of poor weather, this block of 
airspace would be established around designated airports where 
procedural separation is currently employed, i.e. airports with no control 
tower and limited or no radar services. Aircraft flying enroute to a SATS 
airport would be on a standard clearance with Air Traffic Control 
providing separation services. Within the SCA, pilots would take 
responsibility for separation assurance between their aircraft and other 
similarly equipped aircraft. Using onboard equipment and procedures, 
they would then approach and land at the airport. Departures would be 
handled in a similar fashion. This document also provides details for a 
number of off-nominal and emergency procedures which address 
situations that could be expected to occur in a future SCA. The details for 
this operational concept along with a description of candidate aircraft 
systems to support this concept are provided. 
1.0 Introduction 
The ability to conduct concurrent, multiple aircraft operations in poor weather at virtually any airport 
offers an important opportunity for a significant increase in the rate of flight operations, a major 
improvement in passenger convenience, and the potential to foster growth of operations at small airports. 
The Small Aircraft Transportation System, (SATS) Higher Volume Operations (HVO) concept (refs. 1-4) 
is designed to increase capacity at the smaller airports in the United States, airports where only 
procedural separation is currently employed by Air Traffic Control (ATC), i.e., airports with no tower 
and limited or no radar service. During periods of poor weather, a newly defined area of flight operations 
called a Self-Controlled Area (SCA) would be established around these SATS airports. Within the SCA, 
pilots would maintain their own separation from other aircraft using a combination of procedures and 
specialized tools, including localized surveillance data from other aircraft provided by an air-to-air data 
link. While pilots would self-separate within the SCA, a ground-based system located at the airport 
would assign arriving pilots their landing sequence based on aircraft position and missed approach 
requirements. 
HVO relies on participating aircraft broadcasting critical flight information, such as position, heading, 
speed, and planned flight path information to other aircraft via data link. Flight information is received by 
all aircraft and displayed to each pilot. The pilot’s awareness of this traffic, along with the HVO 
procedures and landing sequence information from the ground system, enables a distributed decision-
making environment where the pilot maintains separation and spacing. The HVO concept does not 
depend on an ATC tower or designated approach times but rather allows the pilot to descend and then 
follow the preceding aircraft on the instrument approach. The pilot would use the onboard equipment to 
verify that the altitude and location to which his aircraft is descending is free of other traffic. Once 
adequate spacing behind the preceding aircraft is achieved and can be expected to be preserved 
throughout the approach, the pilot could begin the approach.  
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The HVO concept has the potential to work with any type of instrument approach (e.g., GPS or VOR), 
with the GPS-T approach being the basic approach type used throughout this paper. The generic HVO 
approach consists of dual Initial Approach Fixes (IAFs), approach paths, and a missed approach 
procedure to the Missed Approach Holding Fix (MAHF). Using two IAFs increases the number of 
aircraft ready to immediately start the approach, thereby increasing the approach rate at the airport. To 
minimize pilot and controller workload, the entire approach and missed approach operation is contained 
within the SCA. These features led to the most unique features of the HVO concept: the IAF and MAHF 
are at the same locations, with a unique missed approach procedure to each MAHF. To ensure the ability 
to self-separate even during off-nominal conditions, the maximum number of approach-to-landing 
aircraft allowed in the SCA is determined by the total number of IAFs and the associated holding pattern 
altitudes at those IAFs. For the generic GPS-T which has two IAFs, four arriving aircraft would be 
allowed within the SCA for landing; whether approaching the IAF, in holding at the IAF, on the 
approach, or on a missed approach. 
Uncontrolled airports would only need to make relatively minimal infrastructure investments to 
increase their ability to sustain operations during periods of Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC). Airports would be expected to have a weather reporting capability (e.g., Automated Weather 
Observing System - AWOS) and would need to install an AMM, a ground-based ADS-B receiver, and 
have a data link capability. 
For this operational concept to be viable, a link between the AMM and ATC would be required. This 
link would be necessary to enable ATC to terminate and subsequently re-enable HVO operations when 
necessary to accommodate procedural IFR operations. This link would also be necessary to efficiently 
enable HVO departure operations that would transition into traditional IFR airspace. Additionally, if 
controllers had access to the information relating to the number of aircraft operating in the SCA, this 
could help them better manage aircraft operating into the SCA airport. For example, if controllers knew 
that the SCA was not currently accepting aircraft (because the SCA was full), and that there would be a 
20-minute delay at the airport, they could begin planning for that delay in advance. This information 
could then be provided to arriving aircraft by ATC or possibly broadcast on a system similar to 
Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS). 
Failures and operational errors are also considered. In developing this paper, a major underlying 
assumption was that only pragmatic failures and operational errors (i.e., failures and errors that had a 
practical expectation for occurrence) would be addressed. Hence, while the list of off-nominal conditions 
presented is not complete, it does cover those cases that can reasonably be expected to be the majority of 
off-nominal occurrences. The major design goal for these off-nominal procedures was to minimize 
required changes to procedures and equipment relative to the normal HVO procedures while concurrently 
minimizing the level of system criticality (ref. 5). Also note that the inclusion of some equipment 
specifics in this document was required due to the interaction between equipment design and failures. 
Equipment design can be both a source of failure as well as a means to mitigate failures. Also, because 
equipment implementations can influence operational procedures, every attempt was made to minimize 
the impact of specific equipment implementations on the development of the overall operational concept.  
Since the SATS project was focused on achieving a realistic, operationally deployable system for the 
2010 timeframe, this concept emphasized ease of integration with the current and the planned near-term 
National Airspace System (NAS). It was further assumed that any additional ATC workload must be 
minimized and that enroute procedures would be as similar to today’s system as possible. This concept is 
based on a distributed decision-making environment that would provide pilots with the necessary 
procedures, airborne systems, traffic awareness, and aircraft sequence information to enable safe 
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operations within the SCA while minimizing the requirements for the ground support tools. Since this is a 
distributed decision-making environment, much of the decision-making would be left with the pilot, as it 
is today with visual flight rules (VFR) operations into these non-towered airports. Finally, the overall 
philosophy was to emphasize simplicity and operational safety as major aspects in the design.  
2.0 Design of the Self-Controlled Area (SCA) 
A plan view graphic depicting a generic SCA is shown in figure 1. The SCA would be similar in 
concept to a Class E surface area and is similar to the proposal of reference 6. The waypoints could be 
existing waypoints for a generic Global Positioning System (GPS) T approach. In this concept, the 
outboard Initial Approach Fixes (IAFs) on the T (e.g., ANNIE and CATHY) would be used for all 
arrivals. These fixes would also be used as the missed approach holding fixes. (Note that alternative 
approach designs are discussed in Appendix A.) During low traffic conditions, arriving aircraft could fly 
directly to an IAF at the lowest appropriate IFR altitude and upon reaching the IAF, begin an approach 
operation. During periods of higher traffic conditions, the holding patterns in the SCA would be used to 
delay aircraft while they are waiting for appropriate aircraft-to-aircraft spacing prior to initiating the 
approach and landing. Arriving aircraft would enter at the top of the IAF holding pattern and then 
descend in 1000-foot increments as the altitude below becomes clear until reaching the initial approach 
altitude. At that time, the aircraft would self-separate along the approach path for landing. The profile 
view in figure 2 shows one of these arrival fixes and helps illustrate the holding pattern above the IAF. 
Note also that the shape of the SCA is similar to a Class C airspace design, but offset on the approach-
side of the airport. Additionally, the shape of the SCA may also be tailored to fit the geometry of local 
airspace constraints. The IAFs on the opposite T (not shown in figure 1) could be used as the departure 
fixes. Due to the nominal location of these waypoints, and the requirement to protect the airspace around 
the holding patterns at these waypoints, the SCA would have a radius of approximately 10 nm. This 
would be a generic size and shape, established without any attempts to optimize the SCA size. Note that 
ATC would have to separate traffic operating outside the SCA by the appropriate minima from the SCA 
boundary to ensure separation. A discussion on this, as well as other considerations in implementing an 
SCA from the ATC perspective can be found in reference 7. 
The holding patterns at the IAFs that are established within the SCA conformed to the current design 
standards for holding pattern dimensions. The holding patterns were used to absorb delays for aircraft 
waiting to begin an approach operation; this is consistent with current day use of holding patterns for 
delay absorption at capacity constrained airports. In the SCA, arriving aircraft would enter at the top of 
the holding pattern, or “stack”, drop down in 1000-foot increments as the altitude below becomes clear, 
until reaching the bottom of the stack. At that time, the aircraft would self-separate along the approach 
path for landing. The purpose of the holding pattern in the SCA would be to delay aircraft while they are 
waiting for appropriate aircraft-to-aircraft spacing prior to initiating the approach and landing. 
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Figure 1. Plan view of the Self-Controlled Area 
Figure 2. Profile view of the Self-Controlled Area 
The SATS HVO concept would not depend on a control tower or designated approach times but rather 
would allow the pilot, using onboard equipment, to descend and then follow the preceding aircraft as 
designated by the AMM. The pilot would use the onboard equipment to verify that the altitude and 
location to which his aircraft was descending was free of other traffic. Pilots would then continue down 
the stack until arriving at the initial approach altitude (e.g., 2000 feet above ground level, AGL) at an IAF 
(e.g., CATHY). Once the appropriate approach spacing is obtained, the pilot would depart the IAF and 
continue down the approach. To contain this activity, the height of the SCA was set nominally at 3000 
feet above the airport with the holding locations placed in the SCA at the outboard IAFs (e.g., ANNIE 
and CATHY) at 2000 and 3000 feet at both locations. The profile view in figure 2 shows one of these 
holding locations and helps visualize the stack above the IAF. Under certain conditions, VFR flight may 
be allowed at altitudes below 700 feet AGL. The SCA was sized so as to not penalize these enroute VFR 
operations except in the immediate vicinity of the airport. Again, the altitudes proposed for this airspace 
are nominal. Other altitudes and configurations could be established based on proper analysis and design 
constraints. 
This concept further assumed that pilots would have the ability to contact ATC prior to entering and 
leaving the SCA. While communication is not required, it was assumed that airspace outside of the SCA 
would be under radar surveillance coverage by ATC. Although procedural separation could be used for 
aircraft entering and arriving into the SCA, if radar coverage was available adjacent to the SCA, 
transitions could be handled more efficiently. Outside of the SCA the airspace would be “owned” by 
ATC and ATC would be responsible for providing traditional separation services.  
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Approach sequencing within the SCA would be managed by the AMM, which would rely on aircraft 
position information provided through a ground-based ADS-B receiver. Aircraft would be expected to 
contact the AMM via an Airport-Pilot Data Link Communications (APDLC) system and request landing 
sequence information. The AMM would then provide either a notification of which airplane the pilot 
would follow (if there were one in the sequence ahead of the pilot) or inform the pilot that he cannot enter 
the SCA along with a notification of the delay to expect before an entry would be granted. This sequence 
assignment process supports actions and decisions made by ATC in that the AMM sequences only those 
aircraft at the lowest altitude approaching an IAF, since ATC controls the order in which the aircraft 
arrive at the IAF. This process allows the controller the flexibility to resolve issues unknown to the AMM 
(e.g., crossing airways, weather, and aircraft holding). 
To grant an entry, the AMM must also assure that there would be available missed approach airspace 
for each aircraft that is arriving in the SCA. Since it must be assumed that every approach may result in a 
missed approach and since there would not be an active controller involved in SCA operations (who 
could respond dynamically with unique missed approach instructions), each aircraft entering the SCA 
would be given its MAHF by the AMM as it enters the airspace. This technique would keep the ground-
based automation relatively simple, and render an AMM failure less critical in the operational concept. 
However, it would mean that the total number of operations would be constrained by the number of 
unique missed approach locations that could exist within the SCA. For the SCA shown in figures 1 and 2, 
there are four missed approach holding options (two holding altitudes at each MAHF), therefore there are 
a total of four approach operations allowed at one time in this representation of an SCA. It is expected 
that this design would be modified for specific airport and airspace configurations. However, simple 
analysis has shown that designs with significantly more MAHFs may not significantly increase the 
number of allowable landing operations. 
The objective of this operational concept is to enable increased numbers of operations in non-radar 
airspace (or airspace where procedural separation rules are being applied) at and around small non-
towered airports in near all-weather conditions. For each element of the operational concept, a sample 
scenario is provided to describe that aspect of the operation. Other than the changes for SATS HVO 
operations outlined in this document, normal aircraft operating rules and procedures for non-towered 
facilities may not be explicitly portrayed in the scenarios, but are expected to apply. 
3.0 SCA Operating Rules 
As the definition of this concept evolved, it became obvious to the developers that several operational 
principles and constraints strongly affected the concept design, with the most significant being the 
requirement for missed approach airspace. 
From the maximum of four operations (exclusive of departure operations) for the generic SCA in 
figures 1 and 2, a set of implementation and operating rules were developed. The normal SCA operating 
rules are as follows: 
- No more than four concurrent arrival operations are allowed in the SCA. 
- Entries may not result in the assignment of more than two aircraft to a specific fix, with the 
assignment as either an IAF or a MAHF.  
- Simultaneous entries are not allowed at an IAF. 
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- Entries are allowed at an IAF only if no aircraft is on the approach with that fix assigned as their 
MAHF. 
- Entries are only allowed at altitudes at or below the lowest IFR altitude above the vertical limit of the 
SCA (fig. 3). 
- Vertical entries (descending into the SCA while in the arrival holding pattern) are only allowed at the 
IAFs from the lowest IFR altitude above the SCA. 
- Upon entering the SCA at an IAF, aircraft are to go to the lowest available altitude and then continue 
to descend as altitudes below them become available. 
- Alternating MAHFs are given to sequential aircraft (e.g., the first aircraft is given ANNIE, the second 
aircraft is given CATHY, the third aircraft is given ANNIE, etc.). Note that for operational efficiency 
reasons, if there were no other landing aircraft (i.e., aircraft with entry notifications) in the SCA, the 
first arriving aircraft would be assigned a "same-side" MAHF (e.g., if the arrival fix is CATHY, the 
MAHF will be CATHY). An example approach chart with AZBEJ as the MAHF (equivalent to 
CATHY in the generic figures) is given in figure 4. 
- When proceeding to a holding fix on a missed approach, aircraft are to climb to the lowest available 
altitude (e.g., the first aircraft heading to ANNIE climbs to 2000 feet, the next aircraft going to 
ANNIE climbs to 3000 feet). 
- Aircraft operating in the SCA must be able to climb at 300 feet per mile (required for obtaining the 
required vertical separation at a MAHF if the lower altitude is occupied). 
Figure 3. Example of the lowest IFR altitude (AGL) above the SCA. 
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Figure 4.  Example of an approach chart. 
Missed Approach:  Climbing right turn to lowest 
available (2000 or 3000) via LNAV path to AZBEJ 
and hold. 
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4.0 Aircraft Equipment 
4.1 Conflict Detection and Alerting 
A design decision was made that neither conflict detection and alerting (CD&A) nor conflict detection 
and resolution (CD&R) would be required as a primary means for aircraft separation in conducting HVO. 
That is, the HVO procedures, with the supporting AMM design and relatively simple flight displays, 
would provide the primary means for aircraft-to-aircraft separation within the SATS SCA. It was 
assumed, however, that either CD&A or CD&R would be required as a secondary means for operational 
safety. Given this, the inherent nature of off-nominal situations will probably require an onboard conflict 
detection system to obtain an operationally viable level of safety. A description of an HVO CD&A 
concept is provided in Appendix B with further details provided in references 8-9. 
4.2 Prototype Aircraft Multi-Function Display 
The functionality and display formats of a modern multi-function display (MFD), similar to a current-
generation GPS moving map display, were assumed as the implementation basis for the SATS HVO 
concept. A basic map-page layout for this MFD is shown in figure 5. Major functions and display items 
assumed for the map portion of the MFD are: 
- A track-up, moving map display that includes both geographic and navigation information. 
- Aircraft-centered and aircraft-offset formats. 
- Adjustable map range scales. 
- Programmable bezel buttons. 
- Feature-select knobs. 
 
Figure 5. MFD map layout. 
Feature select knob, 
function specific 
Feature select knob, 
primary functions 
AMM-procedure 
display window 
Pilot Advisor window 
Programmable bezel 
buttons 
  9
In addition to the navigation map information, the MFD would provide traffic information (ref. 10), 
HVO-specific alerting information, and APDLC messages. APDLC messages could provide AMM 
messages as well as general airport information, such as Digital Automatic Terminal Information Service 
(D-ATIS). Note that APDLC is a two-way, addressed data link that would function in a manner similar to 
a Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC, ref. 11) system. The MFD would also include 
both an AMM-procedure display window and a pilot procedure tool window (ref. 12), both unique to the 
HVO concept. An example of the AMM-procedure display window is provided in section 5.2. The pilot 
procedure tool, called the Pilot-Advisor (PA), would provide an automated HVO-specific checklist to the 
pilot relative to the current state of the aircraft and other surrounding traffic. Effectively, the PA would 
provide prompts in the PA window to the pilot regarding the next appropriate procedural step for the 
current HVO procedure (e.g., a message stating that it is clear to descend during an approach operation). 
The PA window would only display one message at a time, with that message being the oldest message 
with the highest priority. Table 1 lists the proposed messages, with priority level 1 as a higher priority 
than priority level 0. For example, the “Monitor Path” (blue, priority level 1) takes precedence and would 
overwrite the “OPEN: 2000” message (black, priority 0). The message text color would be consistent 
with alerting standards (ref. 13). The prototype messages for the PA information, displayed in the PA 
window on the MFD, are provided in table 1. The SATS HVO concept does not require the use of a PA, 
although preliminary tests with subject pilots found it to be highly desirable (ref. 12). The use of these 
messages will be explained in subsequent sections. 
Alerting information, provided in an alert window on the MFD map, along with any appropriate audio 
cues, would also be provided via the MFD. Alerting information would include the following: 
- The availability of any new broadcast message (e.g., AWOS, D-ATIS, or AMM broadcast data). 
- The reception of any new AMM instruction addressed to the aircraft (e.g., entry notification). 
- A new PA message. 
- Traffic conflict messages. 
This MFD implementation, along with the PA tool, is but one possible means for providing an 
airborne capability to support the HVO concept. 
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Table 1. Pilot-Advisor (PA) Messages 
Message definition Example 
message 
Priority 
level 
The pilot is entering the SCA without an entry notification  1 
The pilot is entering the SCA at the wrong IAF.  1 
“Open altitude” informs the pilot of the next altitude that is required for the current 
procedure and indicate that no other aircraft is occupying that altitude. This message 
example informs the pilot that the 3000 ft altitude slot is open (available).  
 0 
The pilot has climbed or descended beyond the open (available) altitude. This 
message would be displayed on the second line of the PA window as a modifier to 
the instruction displayed on the first line. 
 1 
If an operation is pending but has not occurred after a predetermined time due to an 
unexpected delay by the pilot, a "proceed now" prompt will be added to the PA 
message. This message will also be associated with an alert. 
 1 
Time-To-Approach (TTA) defines when the aircraft may leave the IAF with the 
appropriate spacing behind the aircraft it will be following. The example is 1 minute, 
32 seconds before approach initiation. 
 0 
This message shows the pilot that the approach may be initiated.  0 
This message shows that the separation distance from the pilot’s aircraft to the 
preceding approach aircraft is below the nominal value (for either an approach or a 
departure) and that the pilot should reduce speed. 
 1 
The pilot is flying faster than the nominal approach speed.  1 
The pilot is flying slower than the nominal approach speed. This message is 
inhibited if a "too close" message has been issued. 
 1 
The pilot is flying off of the approach path.  1 
The pilot is the second aircraft conducting a missed approach to a common MAHF, 
and he is overtaking the preceding missed approach aircraft. An expedited climb to 
3000 ft is required in this example; this information would be shown on the second 
line of the message window. 
 1 
The pilot is going to the wrong MAHF.  1 
This message shows that a departure may be initiated. It is displayed when the pilot 
is ready for takeoff and there is sufficient separation between both arriving and 
departing aircraft for an HVO departure operation to be performed. 
 0 
The pilot is flying the wrong departure procedure.  1 
 
 
NO SEQUENCE
EXIT SCA
WRONG IAF
OPEN: 3000
OPEN: 3000
MONITOR ALT
TTA: 1:32
OPEN: 2000
PROCEED NOW
OPEN: APPR
TOO FAST
CHECK SPEED
TOO SLOW
CHECK SPEED
OPEN: 3000
CLIMB NOW
WRONG MAHF
OPEN: DEPART
WRONG DP
MONITOR PATH
TOO CLOSE
REDUCE SPD
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5.0 Normal Procedures 
5.1 Preliminary Data Exchange while in Enroute ATC Airspace 
No unique SATS provisions were anticipated for filing and following flight plans, so the pilot would 
simply be required to file a traditional IFR flight plan to the SATS destination airport. The aircraft special 
equipment designator on the flight plan would identify the aircraft to ATC as SATS capable. The final fix 
in the route-of-flight section of the flight plan would be a SATS transition fix, which would be an IAF for 
a SATS instrument approach at the destination SATS airport.  
Note that the AMM would be broadcasting the total number of aircraft that are sequenced for landing 
within the SCA and are requesting entry from outside the SCA. This information could be used by the 
pilot in considering alternate airport options.  
Figure 6. Preliminary data exchange 
Prior to reaching the transition fix, the pilot would request a landing sequence assignment from the 
AMM (fig. 6). Note that the aircraft would be broadcasting, via APDLC, the planned IAF. (Also note that 
while the SCA is depicted as a single cylinder in figure 6, it is actually a two-tiered volume, as depicted 
in figure 2.) To be eligible to request a landing sequence, the aircraft must be within 5 minutes of a 5 nm 
radius around the planned IAF, with the time based on the aircraft’s closure rate with that fix. The AMM 
would then determine a sequence number for the arriving aircraft relative to other aircraft already in the 
SCA. If an arrival opening were available, the AMM would issue an entry notification. If the SCA were 
“full,” the AMM would issue a “STANDBY” notification. The scenario sequence for this operation is 
shown in table 2. This table portrays the chronological order in which airplane or pilot actions, ATC 
actions, and AMM action occur for a typical scenario defining this phase of the SATS operation. Also 
note that a simplified flow chart of a normal HVO arrival operation is provided in Appendix C. 
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Table 2. Preliminary Data Exchange. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
On a standard IFR flight plan to the 
SATS airport. The current clearance 
is to "ANNIE" at 4000 ft. 
  
  Broadcasts number of approach-
requesting aircraft. 
Obtains the ATIS information for the 
airport. 
  
Requests an approach sequence from 
the AMM. Aircraft broadcasts 
planned IAF. 
  
  A sequence number is computed. 
 
5.2 Lateral Transition and Entry into SATS HVO Airspace 
The intent of the lateral entry would be to allow, during periods of low demand, a SATS aircraft to 
directly transition into the SCA at an altitude below the ceiling of the SCA. This direct transition would 
potentially eliminate any holding at the IAF. Since the SCA demand level may not be known until the 
aircraft reaches the vicinity of the SCA, a lateral entry into the SCA should not be flight-planned or 
expected by the SATS pilot.  
To accommodate a lateral entry capability, the SCA was divided into three areas: one departure area 
(in figure 7, this is the top area of the SCA, shown in white) and two arrival areas (in figure 8, the yellow 
and blue areas). To determine if a lateral entry would be permissible, the AMM would use the following 
special rules: 
- If any other aircraft was at the IAF or was assigned to the IAF (e.g., for a missed approach), a Lateral 
Entry Notification (LEN) would not be issued. 
- If the arriving aircraft was on the departure-side of the SCA (in figure 7, this is the top area of the 
SCA, shown in white), a LEN would not be issued. 
- If the arriving aircraft would transition more than one arrival area, a LEN would not be issued. 
- If the entry would result in the assignment of more than 2 aircraft to a fix as either an IAF or as a 
MAHF, a LEN would not be issued. 
- If none of the above exceptions applied, the AMM would issue a LEN. 
  13
Figure 7. Lateral entry areas. 
Figure 8.  Lateral entry into the SCA. 
If a lateral entry was not possible (before the aircraft reached the vicinity of the IAF), the AMM would 
issue a STANDBY message. Under this situation, the SATS pilot should expect a vertical entry into the 
SCA.  
If the arriving aircraft was provided a LEN, a follow notification (FN) and missed-approach fix 
assignment would also be issued from the AMM. The SATS pilot would then request a clearance from 
ATC to depart ATC controlled airspace (fig. 8). Note that a descent to the IAF approach altitude may also 
begin at this time assuming that all other constraints were met (e.g., approval from ATC while in ATC 
airspace and maintaining at or above obstruction clearance altitudes). Once at the IAF, the SATS pilot 
would descend at the IAF to the lowest available altitude at that fix per the SATS procedure. The 
scenario sequence for this operation is shown in table 3. 
O
ANNIE
(IAF)
CATHY
(IAF)
AARON
(FAF)O
HANGS
(IF)
Lateral entry allowedLateral entry allowed
Lateral entry allowed
(after abeam
runway threshold)
Lateral entry allowed
(after abeam
runway threshold)
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Table 3. Lateral Transition from Enroute ATC Airspace. 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
On a standard IFR flight plan to the 
SATS IAF, "ANNIE," at 4000 ft. 
  
Aircraft sends planned IAF and 
landing request. 
  
  Determines that a lateral entry is 
permissible at ANNIE. 
  Prior to ANNIE, transmits LEN, 
FN, and MAHF information. 
Confirms that there are no other 
aircraft at ANNIE. 
  
Requests clearance to depart ATC 
controlled airspace, transition prior to 
ANNIE at 2000 ft. 
  
 Clears aircraft to depart ATC 
airspace. 
 
Transitions into the SCA at 2000 ft 
and continues direct routing to 
ANNIE. 
  
As described in section 4.2, an AMM-procedure display window would be provided on the MFD (fig. 
5). For an approach operation, this window would provide a sequenced list of actions that would be part 
of this operation. In the example of figure 9, the window shows that the pilot is to perform a lateral entry 
at ANNIE, then follow the aircraft with the identifier of N12345. If a missed approach was required, the 
MAHF would be CATHY. The items would be automatically removed from this list as they are 
performed. 
Figure 9. Example of the AMM-procedure window on the MFD. 
5.3 Vertical Transition from Enroute ATC Airspace to the SATS SCA Boundary 
For a vertical transition into the SCA, the AMM would issue a vertical entry notification (VEN) and a 
FN to the SATS aircraft. The FN pairs the SATS aircraft with the aircraft it would follow. If there was no 
preceding aircraft to follow, the FN would indicate “NONE.” The SATS pilot could then request a 
descent from ATC.  
If an approach sequence was not currently available, the AMM would continue to issue a STANDBY 
message. The pilot could then use the AMM broadcast of the number of SCA arrival operations to 
estimate the landing delay and advise ATC of the need for a hold. The scenario sequence for this 
operation is shown in table 4. 
ENTRY: LAT
KMFV-IAF: ANNIE
FOLLOW: N12345
GPS3-MAHF: CATHY
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All of the following rules must be met prior to the AMM permitting a vertical entry into the SCA: 
- There are fewer than two aircraft at the fix (as an IAF) or assigned to it (as a MAHF). 
- There are no other entries in progress at the specific fix. 
- No other aircraft that are assigned to that fix as a MAHF are on the approach. 
- The entry will not result in the assignment of more than two aircraft to the fix as either an IAF or as a 
MAHF. 
Table 4. Vertical Transition from Enroute ATC Airspace. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
  Broadcasts that there are 6 
preceding traffic1. 
Contacts ATC and advises of a 20 
minute delay (estimated by the pilot 
based on the number of preceding 
aircraft)1. 
  
 ATC issues a holding instruction to 
the SATS pilot: "N1234S, hold 
west of ANNIE as published, 
maintain 4000 feet. Advise when 
ready to enter the SCA." Note that 
ANNIE has a depicted, enroute 
holding pattern1. 
 
  Once SCA airspace is available, 
transmits a VEN, a FN, and 
MAHF information. 
1 Only required for a delay. A loss of voice communication capability is accomplished via a SATS procedure 
(section 6.5.7) in lieu of an expect further clearance time from ATC. 
 
5.4 Vertical Entry into SATS HVO Airspace 
Once the airspace below the SCA transition altitude becomes available and the aircraft is at the lowest 
IFR altitude above the SCA, the AMM would issue a VEN and a FN to the aircraft. This airspace 
availability would occur as the preceding aircraft (at the same IAF) also descends or begins the approach 
(fig. 10). The SATS pilot would then confirm, via the SATS MFD, that he was cleared to descend into 
the SCA. Note that the PA would provide an “OPEN: 3000” message (see table 1). The SATS pilot 
would then request a clearance from ATC to descend. Once cleared by ATC, the SATS pilot would 
descend at the IAF to the lowest available altitude at that fix per the SATS procedure. The scenario 
sequence for this operation is shown in table 5. 
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Figure 10. Vertical entry into the SCA at the transition fix. 
Table 5. Vertical Entry into SATS HVO Airspace. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
  Determines that at least one slot 
is available, that one slot is open 
at the IAF, and that the aircraft is 
at the lowest IFR altitude above 
the SCA. 
  Transmits IAF, VEN, FN, and 
MAHF information. 
Confirms open slot at 3000ft.   
Requests descent.   
 Clears aircraft for descent and 
departure from ATC airspace. 
 
Descends into SCA, holding at the 
IAF at 3000ft1. 
  
Descends to the lowest possible 
altitude at the IAF. 
  
1 only required if there is an aircraft at the lower altitude at the IAF. 
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5.5 Continued Descent at the Initial Approach Fix 
As the airspace becomes available at lower levels at the IAF, the SATS pilot would descend to that 
level. This availability would occur as the preceding aircraft also descends or begins the approach 
(fig. 11). Note that the pilot would receive an “OPEN: 2000” from the PA. The scenario sequence for this 
operation is shown in table 6. 
 
Figure 11. Descending at the initial approach fix. 
Table 6. Continued Descent at the Initial Approach Fix. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
Determines that a lower level is 
available at the IAF. 
  
Descends to 2000ft.   
 
5.6 Initiating the Approach 
Upon receiving the FN, the SATS pilot must determine if the preceding aircraft is spaced sufficiently 
far ahead, based on a self-spacing interval (discussed later in this section), such that he could begin his 
own approach. Note that the leading aircraft could be at the opposite IAF (e.g., CATHY vs. ANNIE). In 
this instance, the pilot could be assisted by the PA with an approach spacing message. Prior to sufficient 
spacing, the PA would provide a time-to-approach message (e.g., “TTA: 1:32,” see table 1) to indicate 
that the pilot must wait for 1 minute and 32 seconds before initiating the approach. Once sufficient 
spacing exists, the PA would provide an “OPEN: APPR” messaging denoting that the approach is 
“open.” 
All SATS aircraft should be able to self-space using a baseline procedure. This baseline procedure 
would be used to delay at the IAF until the spacing from the lead aircraft met the spacing criteria. SATS 
pilots desiring greater efficiency could be helped through onboard tools (i.e., a Pilot Advisor system) that 
would enable the pilot to dynamically manage spacing. In this latter case, this determination would be 
based on his aircraft’s planned performance, the actual and planned performance for the preceding 
aircraft, the approach geometry, wind conditions, and other factors. Once the spacing criterion had been 
met, the pilot would leave the holding pattern and initiate the approach (fig. 12). The scenario sequence 
for this operation is shown in table 7. 
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Figure 12.  Initiating the approach. 
Three proposals have been developed for approach initiation and approach spacing. The order of these 
proposals is from low efficiency and low complexity to high efficiency and high complexity. Note that 
low efficiency relates to a high "error budget" in the design. That is, if only low fidelity data or little 
processing were required, a large error allowance would be required for operational acceptability. Also 
note that these procedures would probably be unique or customized for each approach. The three 
proposals are: 
- Simple charted procedure: For example, when the leading aircraft was 6 nm from the runway (as 
would be shown on the SATS approach display), the SATS pilot could start his approach.  
- Pair-wise initiation: A somewhat more efficient but more complex alternative to this concept would 
be an approach speed based technique, where the pair-wise differences in the planned approach 
speeds [both before and after the final approach fix (FAF) for both aircraft] would be used in the 
determination of the aircraft separation prior of the initiation of the approach. This is the technique 
used in the PA example. 
- Active spacing: The most sophisticated and efficient technique would begin with the previously 
described pair-wise means for initiating the approach. It would then use continuous, dynamic speed 
guidance for active spacing relative to the leading aircraft. 
Table 7. Initiating the Approach. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
Determines if the preceding aircraft is 
sufficiently far ahead such that it can 
begin its own approach. 
  
If the preceding aircraft is sufficiently 
far ahead, begins the approach. 
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5.7 Flying the Approach 
No unique SATS HVO requirements were identified for navigation and guidance along the front-side 
(i.e., prior to the missed approach point) of the approach (fig.13). The scenario sequence for this 
operation is shown in table 8. 
During the approach, the aircraft would continuously monitor, via an onboard alerting capability, the 
relative spacing between it and the preceding aircraft. (For the PA example, the PA function that 
computes the spacing interval required to initiate the approach could also be used to provide alerting. 
Simple calculations within the PA, using aircraft speeds, the approach geometry, and a safety buffer, 
would probably be sufficient for this application.) If the following aircraft were predicted to get closer 
than the nominal spacing, then an alert would be given to the following aircraft to reduce its approach 
speed. If the following aircraft were predicted to get closer than the safety minima to the aircraft that it is 
following, then a procedure (section 6.4.2) would be used to mitigate this situation. Also note that while 
the missed approach segment is part of the approach, it is discussed in a subsequent section. 
Figure 13. Flying the approach. 
Table 8. Flying the Approach. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
Monitoring spacing during the 
approach1. 
  
Reduces speed if getting closer than 
nominal. 
  
Performs loss-of-spacing procedure if 
spacing is too close. 
  
Visually acquires approach end of 
runway (Category I conditions). 
  
1 may have a Pilot Advisor or dynamic speed guidance. 
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5.8 Landing 
Because the landing operation (fig. 14) would occur in visual conditions, there are no unique SATS 
HVO system requirements for this phase of flight. If the aircraft cannot land, then the missed approach 
procedure would be flown. 
Figure 14. Landing. 
5.9 Initiating a Missed Approach 
The AMM would not assign two consecutive aircraft to the same MAHF. The MAHFs would 
nominally be the two IAFs on the GPS T (e.g., ANNIE and CATHY, in figure 15). Aircraft on a missed 
approach would go to the lowest available holding altitude (fig. 16), simplifying the transition for another 
approach. The scenario sequence for this operation is shown in table 9. 
If a missed approach was required, the SATS aircraft, as in normal IFR procedures, could begin a 
climb to the missed approach altitude at any point along the instrument approach path prior to the missed 
approach point (MAP). It is expected that the MFD would provide the MAHF information to the pilot. 
This information should reduce the possibility of the pilot turning toward the wrong MAHF. As in 
normal IFR procedures, the turn to the MAHF may not begin until the aircraft passes the missed approach 
point. Once the aircraft initiates its missed approach, that action is broadcast by the aircraft, and the 
aircraft would be automatically re-sequenced for another approach. The operation to depart the SCA from 
the missed approach is defined in a subsequent section. 
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Figure 15. Plan view of missed approach. 
Figure 16. Missed approach. 
Table 9. Initiating a Missed Approach. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
Initiates missed approach procedure. 
Aircraft broadcasts missed approach 
initiation. 
  
Determines the lowest available 
altitude at the MAHF. 
  
Climbs to the lowest available 
altitude at the MAHF. 
  
  Transmits new FN and MAHF 
information. 
Holds at the MAHF.   
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5.10 Initiating a Departure 
A pilot who wants to depart the SATS airport would file a normal IFR flight plan that would include a 
designated SCA departure procedure, also noting that a traditional flight plan would also include an 
expected time of departure (ETD). The departure procedure would include a minimum of one departure 
fix outside of the SCA. A generic SATS airport would have two departure fixes which would typically be 
the opposite-direction IAFs for the runway (fig. 17). In a manner similar to current operations at remote 
airports, approximately 30 minutes prior to the planned departure time, the pilot would contact ATC or 
flight service to obtain a clearance. With the receipt of the clearance, the pilot would also be informed of 
any expected delay that would affect the ETD. Note that the SATS pilot may only receive a short range 
clearance (ref. 14) that would end at the last fix of the departure procedure (which is outside of the SCA). 
A simplified flow chart of a normal HVO departure operation is provided in Appendix C. 
Figure 17. Plan view of generic SATS airport depicting two departure fixes. 
Prior to the ETD and including any additional delay that was advised by ATC, the SATS pilot would 
have completed all preflight checks and be ready to depart the SATS airport. Immediately prior to the 
ETD, the SATS pilot would monitor the approach stream (i.e., the aircraft that are on the approach) for a 
potential departure slot. The determination of a departure slot could be done in a manner similar to the 
options used for initiating an approach (i.e., from a simple Cockpit Display of Traffic Information - CDTI 
based procedure through an advanced automation tool). Once a departure slot had been identified, the 
SATS pilot would contact ATC through a Remote Transmitter Receiver, Remote Communications Outlet 
(RCO), CPDLC, or some other means to obtain a departure release. In a normal situation, it would be 
expected that ATC would immediately release the aircraft for entry into traditional ATC controlled 
airspace. This release would include a void time. 
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The SATS pilot would then confirm, via an automated check with the AMM, that the ADS-B output 
and APDLC were operating correctly. The SATS pilot would then confirm, or delay as appropriate to 
ensure, that a safe departure was possible, taxi on to the runway, and depart (fig. 18). The scenario 
sequence for this operation is shown in table 10. 
Figure 18.  Initiating a departure. 
If ATC was unable to accept the departure aircraft at the time of the pilot's request, ATC would 
normally provide an expected delay time. At the end of that expected delay time, the SATS pilot, having 
repeated the last several departure steps, would again contact ATC for a departure release. 
Table 10. Initiating a Departure. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
Files a standard IFR flight plan that 
includes the SCA departure 
procedure. 
  
30 minutes prior to the planned 
departure time, contacts ATC (direct 
or via Flight Service) for the 
clearance. 
  
 Provides IFR clearance and any 
expected departure delay time. 
 
Immediately prior to ETD, resolves a 
departure slot. 
  
Immediately prior to departure slot, 
calls ATC for release. 
  
 Provides release and void time.  
Confirms ADS-B and APDLC 
operation. 
  
As departure slot becomes available, 
taxis on to runway and initiates the 
departure. 
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5.11 Flying a Departure 
The SATS pilot would depart the airport according to the departure procedure. Once the aircraft 
transitions the SCA boundary (either laterally or vertically), ATC would begin providing traditional ATC 
services expected for IFR aircraft. The pilot would contact ATC while climbing out on the HVO 
departure procedure (fig. 19). The scenario sequence for this operation is shown in table 11. 
Figure 19. Departure. 
Table 11. Flying a Departure. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
Departs the airport on a departure 
procedure. 
  
Establishes contact with ATC.   
 ATC provides IFR services.  
Transitions into traditional ATC 
controlled airspace. 
  
 
5.12 Multiple Departures 
If an aircraft immediately preceded another departure operation, the second departing aircraft would 
have to perform an additional procedure to assure separation safety, beyond that defined in the previous 
section. If the preceding aircraft was departing on another departure route (e.g., to ELLEN), then the 
second aircraft would wait until the first departure reached a point on the route that assured safe lateral 
separation (e.g., 3 nm). If the aircraft was departing on the same route, then sufficient longitudinal 
separation must be assured throughout the procedure, including the transition into traditional ATC 
controlled airspace. Techniques similar to the determination of arrival separation for departing aircraft 
could be used for the determination of longitudinal separation on departure. One simple example of this 
technique would be to require the first departure to be 10 nm along the departure procedure (fig. 20) 
before the second aircraft would be allowed to request an IFR release. The scenario sequence for this 
operation is shown in table 12. 
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Figure 20. In-trail departure. 
Table 12. Multiple Departures. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
Perform procedures defined in 
Initiates a Departure, modified as 
noted below. 
  
Immediately prior to ETD, resolves a 
departure slot with arriving aircraft. 
  
Immediately prior to ETD, resolves a 
departure slot with departing aircraft. 
  
Prior to departure slot, calls ATC for 
release. 
  
 Provides release and void time.  
As departure slot becomes available, 
taxi on to runway and initiates the 
departure. 
  
 
5.13 Initiating a Departure from a Missed Approach 
As noted in the Initiating a Missed Approach section, the aircraft would be automatically re-sequenced 
for another approach. If the SATS pilot decided that he wished to depart the SCA and transition into 
traditional ATC controlled airspace, he would obtain an IFR clearance from ATC. This may be done 
using any of today's tools including the techniques identified in the Initiating a Departure section. Until a 
clearance and a subsequent IFR release were received, the SATS pilot would hold at the MAHF at the 
lowest available altitude.  
It should be noted that once all of the previously sequenced aircraft land, this departing aircraft would 
effectively block all other approach operations in the SCA since this aircraft would be the first aircraft in 
the approach sequence. While several techniques have been examined to mitigate this situation, they all 
require further study. 
Once this departing aircraft received its IFR release, the SATS pilot would fly the lateral track of the 
approach procedure. Unless receiving alternate transition instructions from ATC, upon turning onto the 
final approach course, the SATS pilot would initiate a climb to transition out of the SCA (fig. 21). The 
scenario sequence for this operation is shown in table 13. 
  26
Figure 21. Departure from a missed approach. 
Table 13. Departure from a Missed Approach. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
SATS Aircraft / Pilot ATC AMM 
Holds at the MAHF.   
"Air files" an IFR flight plan.   
 Provides IFR clearance and IFR 
release to enter traditional ATC 
controlled airspace. 
 
With normal approach sequencing 
and separation, initiates approach 
procedure (without descent). 
  
On final approach course, initiates 
climb to depart SCA. 
  
 
5.14 Non-Equipped IFR Aircraft 
An aircraft not equipped for SATS operations could use the SATS airport in a manner that would be 
identical to current IFR operation. As in today’s systems, the non-SATS pilot would request an 
instrument approach or departure from ATC. ATC would then communicate with the AMM to inhibit the 
AMM from accepting any new SATS HVO requests (fig. 22). The AMM would also provide ATC with 
the number of current operations so that ATC may estimate the expected delay time until all current 
SATS HVO operations were completed. The AMM would then notify ATC when the SCA becomes 
sterile and also that the AMM was now inhibited from further SCA operations. At this time, ATC could 
clear the non-SATS airplane for a normal IFR operation. Once this operation was completed, ATC would 
communicate with the AMM to remove the “inhibit” of the AMM so that the AMM could accept new 
SATS HVO requests. The scenario sequence for this operation is shown in table 14. 
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Figure 22. Non-equipped IFR aircraft. 
Table 14. Non-Equipped IFR aircraft. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Non-SATS Pilot ATC AMM 
Requests a traditional IFR departure 
or approach from ATC. 
  
 Acknowledges the IFR request.  
 Sends an inhibit message to the 
AMM. 
 
  Inhibits all new operations. 
  Sends a “sterile” and AMM 
inhibited message to ATC after all 
HVO operations have been 
completed. 
 Clears pilot for IFR operation.  
Completes operation, cancels IFR.   
 Sends a message to the AMM to 
terminate the “inhibit.” 
 
 
6.0 Off-Nominal Operations 
During the development of the off-nominal operational procedures, it was recognized that procedures 
cannot be written for every possible scenario, and that voice communication will sometimes be essential 
in safely concluding an off-nominal operation. Development of these proposed off-nominal operations 
will still require a safety fault tree analysis and experiments to validate them. This paper offers one 
possible implementation, i.e., using a MFD and a PA. However, other implementation schemes are 
possible, and the PA functionality is not a requirement of HVO. 
 
6.1 Off-Nominal Categories 
The off-nominal conditions that were identified for inclusion into the HVO procedures were classified 
into four categories: routine off-nominal operations, procedural deviations, equipment malfunctions, and 
aircraft emergency procedures. 
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6.1.1 Routine Off-Nominal 
The routine off-nominal operations that were identified included: 
- A pilot cancellation of an approach request. 
- A change of landing approach direction. 
- A pilot cancellation of a departure request. 
- Unique approach spacing requirements. 
6.1.2 Procedural Deviations 
The procedural deviations that were identified included: 
- An aircraft returning to an incorrect MAHF. 
- A loss of aircraft-to-aircraft spacing on approach. 
- The inability to use an assigned IAF or MAHF. 
6.1.3 Equipment Malfunctions 
The equipment malfunctions that were identified included: 
- The loss of aircraft state data output on an arriving aircraft. 
- The loss of aircraft state data output on a departing aircraft. 
- The loss of aircraft state data input on an arriving aircraft. 
- The loss of aircraft state data input on a departing aircraft. 
- The loss of the AMM. 
- The loss of AMM reception by a single aircraft. 
- The loss of voice radio communication capability. 
6.1.4 Emergency Procedures 
The emergency procedures that were identified included the following: 
- A priority-landing request from an aircraft with an entry notification. 
- A priority-landing request from a departing aircraft. 
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Examples of these two emergency conditions are shown in figures 23 and 24. Figure 23 is an example 
of a priority-landing request from an aircraft holding for an approach at ANNIE at 3000 ft. In this figure, 
the aircraft at the highest altitude has made a priority request and will ultimately be allowed to follow the 
aircraft on final approach, landing ahead of the aircraft holding at the lower altitudes. Figure 24 is an 
example of a priority-landing request from a departing aircraft. This condition would occur if an aircraft 
conducting an HVO departure needed an unplanned, immediate return to the airport. In this figure, the 
departing aircraft (the right-most aircraft) has made the landing request and will be allowed to land before 
the two aircraft on the farther holding patterns. 
The procedures that were developed to support these identified conditions are provided in the 
subsequent sections. 
Figure 23. Example of a priority-landing request. 
Figure 24. Example of priority landing request from a departing aircraft. 
 
6.2 Implementation Considerations for Off-Nominal Operations 
The addition of off-nominal operations in this document, and the development of their operational 
procedures have, not surprisingly, led to some increase in the overall complexity of the concept required 
to support these operations. However, as in the development of the normal operational procedures, these 
procedures were based, whenever possible, on similar existing procedures for VFR operations or non-
radar, IFR operations. Also, with regard to VFR operations, it is important to reiterate that the normal 
operational procedures allow for mixed operations of both SATS and VFR aircraft, where these 
operations are expected to be accommodated in a manner similar to today’s mix of procedural-IFR and 
VFR aircraft, i.e., the pilot is responsible to see and avoid other traffic (ref. 14). 
Aircraft requesting 
priority 
Aircraft requesting 
priority 
  30
Some, off-nominal operations, especially the detection of equipment failures, will require a method for 
checking the operation of the different hardware and software systems. Periodic system-to-system checks 
and some data retention outside of the AMM can help mitigate the effects of these types of off-nominal 
operations. As such, the following requirements were identified to support the off-nominal procedures. 
- Changes to the SCA state data information must be confirmed (performed in two phases) 
1. System-to-system (e.g., AMM to the aircraft via the APDLC) information exchange would 
require confirmation from the receiver back to the sender. 
2. A confirmation process within the aircraft would be required between the aircraft systems and the 
pilot (e.g., the pilot would be alerted to a change and would respond with the activation of a 
confirmation/accept button on the MFD). 
- Periodic AMM status messages would be sent to all participating aircraft. 
- Periodic ADS-B reception messages from the AMM would be sent to participating aircraft. After the 
AMM has received an ADS-B message from the aircraft, it would periodically reply with a message 
back to the aircraft noting that the aircraft’s ADS-B message has been received. This message is 
necessary to alert aircraft to a loss of their ADS-B output or APDLC input capabilities. 
- Prior to takeoff, departing aircraft would require the reception of both an AMM normal-operation 
status message and an ADS-B reception message from the AMM. 
- Current SCA status information (e.g., the number of operations and aircraft identification) would be 
sent from the AMM to all participating aircraft. 
- Each participating aircraft would retain state data from the AMM on all surrounding SCA traffic. This 
information would be used by the pilots in situations when a reversion to pilot-to-pilot procedural 
separation is required due to the loss of aircraft state data information. These situations would be 
analogous to ATC procedures upon the loss of ATC radar information. 
- Periodic AMM normal-operation status messages would be sent to ATC (e.g., the number of 
operations and aircraft identification). 
It is also important to note that while ADS-B would be the primary means for the dissemination of 
aircraft state data, the APDLC could be used to provide a secondary means for data exchange. Therefore, 
failures such as the loss of state data transmission are procedurally addressed only if all means of 
transmission have failed. 
In the event of any system failure that would result in the aircraft reverting to procedural separation 
(noted in the subsequent sections), it is envisioned that the PA, using the retained SCA status information 
and the retained participating aircraft state data, would assist the pilot in performing the relevant HVO 
procedure.  
Also note that any situation that would require closing the airport, e.g., a single-runway airport with 
the runway closed due to an accident, would require all approach aircraft to conduct a procedure similar 
to Initiating a Departure from a Missed Approach, described in section 5.13. 
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6.3 Routine Off-Nominal Procedures 
6.3.1 Pilot Cancellation of an Approach Request 
It is envisioned that this procedure would be used when weather conditions within the SCA would be 
marginal VFR and with the instrument approach operation transitioning to a visual approach. For a pilot 
to cancel an HVO approach, VFR conditions to the airport must exist (although the aircraft may remain 
on an IFR flight plan). An example of this situation is shown in figure 25. 
Canceling aircraft: 
1. The pilot would select the “cancel approach” feature on the MFD. 
2. The MFD would send the cancellation request to the AMM. 
3. The AMM would send a cancellation notice to all aircraft. 
4. The MFD would notify the pilot that his cancellation request was received by the AMM. 
5. The AMM would mark the aircraft as a non-participating aircraft (i.e., it is assumed that the 
aircraft has transitioned to VFR). 
6. If the canceling aircraft has not received an entry notification (i.e., it was outside the SCA with a 
standby notification), the AMM would delete the aircraft from its request queue. 
7. If the aircraft had received an entry notification: 
- The canceling pilot would announce the cancellation over the Common Traffic Advisory 
Frequency (CTAF). 
- The AMM would remove the canceling aircraft from the approach sequence. 
- The AMM would re-sequence the aircraft that followed the aircraft canceling HVO. 
- The AMM would send the new sequence information to all aircraft. 
Figure 25. Example of an aircraft canceling a HVO approach. 
Canceling aircraft 
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Other aircraft: 
1. The MFD would identify the canceling aircraft as a non-participating aircraft. 
2. If the aircraft had an approach sequence and that sequence was changed (i.e., re-sequenced by the 
AMM), the MFD would notify the SATS pilot to the changes in the approach information (e.g., 
new leading aircraft and/or MAHF). 
3. The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., OPEN: 3000, OPEN: 
APPROACH) until the pilot of the re-sequenced aircraft acknowledged the re-sequence. This 
acknowledgement could occur via a button-press on the MFD. 
Note that for this and all other procedures that require an information exchange (e.g., cancellation 
request or re-sequence data) between the pilot and the onboard system, an acknowledgement by the pilot 
would be required. Similarly, an information exchange between the onboard system and the AMM would 
also require an underlying (system-to-system) data exchange confirmation (e.g., an acknowledgement). 
This acknowledgement could occur via a data link “handshake” between the two systems. The scenario 
sequence for this operation is shown in table 15. 
Table 15. Pilot Cancellation of an Approach Request. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Canceling Aircraft Other SATS HVO Aircraft AMM 
Pilot selects “cancel approach.”   
MFD sends cancellation request to 
the AMM. 
  
  Sends a cancellation notice to all 
aircraft. 
MFD confirms cancellation to the 
pilot. 
MFD identifies the canceling 
aircraft. 
 
  Marks the canceling aircraft as a 
non-participating aircraft. 
  Re-sequences approach aircraft. 
  Sends new sequence information. 
 If re-sequenced, MFD notifies pilot 
of change of approach information. 
 
 If re-sequenced, continuing-
operations inhibited until pilot 
acknowledges the re-sequence. 
 
 
 
6.3.2  Change of Approach Direction 
The decision of determining the direction for the approach and the active runway should probably be 
made by ATC, and may require new ATC support tools for this determination. However, pilots should be 
allowed to provide feedback and input into the decision. Further investigation of this issue is required, to 
determine the best method for making this decision.   
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Normal changes of runway landing direction should be made prior to aircraft being provided entry 
notifications. That is, prior to changing landing direction ATC should inhibit new arrivals until all 
ongoing SCA operations have been completed, holding the new arrivals above the SCA until all current 
SCA operations have been completed. The SCA approach direction may not need to change if circle-to-
land operations are used. Assuming that a change to the instrument approach direction must take place 
while aircraft are conducting SCA approach operations, the following should occur (the scenario 
sequence for this operation is shown in table 16): 
1. The AMM should inhibit all new SCA operations. 
2. The AMM should notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
3. The AMM would confirm the planned configuration change with ATC and identify all active 
aircraft. 
4. All landing aircraft should either land or conduct a missed approach operation. 
5. Missed approach aircraft should contact ATC to obtain a clearance to the MAHF at the lowest 
IFR altitude above the SCA. 
6. At the completion of all HVO approach operations, which would occur when all aircraft have 
either landed or are no longer actively conducting SATS operations, the AMM would reconfigure 
the SCA for the new landing direction. 
7. Once all of these actions have occurred, ATC may allow the AMM to resume SCA operations. 
Table 16. Change of Approach Direction. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
HVO Aircraft ATC AMM 
  Inhibits all new operations. 
  Notifies ATC of inhibit status and 
change of landing direction. 
Land in sequence or conduct missed 
approach operations. 
  
Missed approach aircraft must 
contact ATC for a clearance and then 
depart the SCA. 
  
  After all HVO operations have 
terminated, changes the landing 
direction. 
  Notifies ATC of change of landing 
direction. 
 If desired, enables new HVO 
operations via AMM. 
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6.3.3 Pilot Cancellation of a Departure Request 
If a pilot cancels an SCA departure request, the following should occur: 
1. PA alerting would be inhibited for the canceling aircraft. 
2. All other aircraft would continue with their normal operations. 
The scenario sequence for this operation is shown in table 17. 
Table 17. Cancellation of a Departure Request. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Canceling Aircraft Other SATS HVO Aircraft AMM 
PA alerting is inhibited.   
 Continue normal operations.  
 
6.3.4 Leading Aircraft Conducting a Circle-to-Land 
This situation would occur if the leading aircraft plans to conduct a circle-to-land operation. For this 
situation, the following procedure should be used: 
1. The pilot of the circle-to-land aircraft would select this function on the MFD. 
2. The MFD of the circle-to-land aircraft would send the circle-to-land information to include the 
intended landing runway to all aircraft. 
3. The following aircraft would delay initiating its approach until the circle-to-land aircraft has 
landed or performed a missed approach.  
The scenario sequence for this operation is shown in table 18. 
Table 18. Circle-To-Land. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Circle-To-Land Aircraft Following Aircraft AMM 
Pilot selects circle-to-land function 
on MFD. 
  
Aircraft sends circle-to-land 
notification to all aircraft. 
  
 Delays the approach until the 
circle-to-land aircraft completes its 
operation. 
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6.4 Procedural Deviations 
6.4.1 Aircraft Proceeding to an Incorrect Missed Approach Holding Fix 
This procedure addresses the problem of an HVO pilot attempting to fly an incorrect missed approach 
procedure for the instrument approach. Note that for a pilot to turn toward the wrong MAHF, the pilot 
would have already made the following errors: performed the incorrect missed approach procedure; 
ignored the MAHF identified in the MFD “to waypoint” data block; ignored the missed approach 
procedure depicted on the moving map display of the MFD (and any associated primary flight guidance 
information on the Primary Flight Display - PFD); and ignored the PA alert for an incorrect missed 
approach procedure. 
In the event that an aircraft does accidentally attempt to return to the wrong MAHF, the following 
procedure should be performed once the pilot recognizes the error (e.g., observes the correct MAHF 
name on the MFD): 
1. The pilot should make a call over CTAF announcing the problem. 
2. The pilot should contact ATC as soon as possible and announce the problem. 
3. Due to the potential loss of separation with other aircraft on the instrument approach, this aircraft 
must not attempt to return to the assigned MAHF. The pilot should continue climbing along the 
errant missed approach path to an altitude above the SCA.  
4. The pilot should immediately contact ATC and request an IFR clearance from ATC. If possible, 
this clearance should be obtained prior to departing the SCA. 
Figure 26.  Example of an aircraft going to an incorrect MAHF. 
An example of this scenario is shown in figure 26 and the scenario sequence for this operation is 
shown in table 19. 
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Table 19. Aircraft Going To an Incorrect MAHF. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Problem Aircraft Other SATS HVO Aircraft AMM 
Pilot notifies other aircraft of 
problem via CTAF 
  
Pilot notifies ATC of problem.   
Pilot continues climb above SCA.   
Pilot requests ATC clearance.   
 
6.4.2 Loss of Aircraft-To-Aircraft Spacing on Approach 
An aircraft that is predicted to lose aircraft-to-aircraft spacing while on the approach and subsequently 
receives a loss-of-spacing alert should do the following: 
1. Begin an immediate climb to its missed approach altitude. 
2. Fly the lateral path of the approach and subsequent missed approach. 
3. Fly the planned approach speeds (to maintain conformance for other SCA aircraft), where these 
speeds are either standard speeds for the aircraft or pre-selected by the pilot. 
An example of this scenario is shown in figure 27 and the scenario sequence for this operation is 
shown in table 20. 
Figure 27.  Example of an aircraft with a predicted loss of spacing on approach. 
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Table 20. Loss of Spacing on Approach. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Following Aircraft Other SATS HVO Aircraft AMM 
Climbs to the missed approach 
altitude. 
  
Flies the lateral path of the approach, 
to include the missed approach. 
  
Maintains the planned approach 
speeds until crossing the runway 
threshold. 
  
 
6.4.3 Unable to Use an Assigned IAF or MAHF 
This condition may occur because of severe weather at the IAF or MAHF.  
If this situation occurs while still in ATC managed airspace, the pilot should coordinate with ATC to 
proceed to the other IAF or divert to another airport.   
If the aircraft is within the SCA when this situation occurs, the pilot should climb above the SCA in 
the safest possible manner, avoiding obstacles, other aircraft, and severe weather. During the climb, the 
pilot should notify ATC of the situation. Contacting ATC is a priority since the aircraft could be entering 
controlled airspace without a clearance. The scenario sequence for this operation is shown in table 21. 
Table 21. Unable to Use an Assigned Fix. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Problem Aircraft Other SATS HVO Aircraft AMM 
Contacts ATC and requests a new 
clearance. 
  
Climbs to an altitude above the SCA.   
 
6.5 Equipment Malfunctions 
6.5.1 Loss of ADS-B Output on an Arriving SATS Aircraft 
This situation would occur if an arriving aircraft had lost the capability to transmit its state data 
information via ADS-B. If this situation exists, the following should occur: 
Aircraft Without an Arrival Sequence: 
Part of the arrival sequencing process that the AMM performs is the confirmation of ADS-B state data 
output from the requesting aircraft. If the aircraft has not already been issued an arrival sequence, the 
AMM would attempt to confirm the aircraft’s ADS-B transmit capability (and all other data output 
capabilities) prior to the sequence notification. If there is no ADS-B output, the aircraft would be notified 
of this condition, and it would be not be provided with an entry notification. 
  38
Aircraft With an Entry Notification and with APDLC Output: 
If the aircraft has an entry notification and subsequently loses its ADS-B output but still has APDLC 
capability, the following should occur: 
1. The AMM, noting the loss of the ADS-B signal from an aircraft, would inhibit all new SCA 
operations. 
2. The AMM would notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
3. The AMM, noting the loss of an ADS-B signal from an aircraft, would send that aircraft a “lost 
ADS-B output” message that could be displayed as an alert message on the MFD. The problem 
aircraft would then begin (or continue) transmitting its position data over the APDLC. This 
APDLC message would be broadcast to all aircraft in the SCA. 
4. The AMM would resume normal operations after the problem aircraft has landed. The AMM 
would then also set the SCA status appropriately. 
The scenario sequence for this operation is shown in table 22. 
Table 22. Arriving Aircraft Without ADS-B Output But With APDLC Output. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Problem Aircraft Other SATS HVO Aircraft AMM 
  Identified loss of ADS-B output and 
inhibits new operations into the 
SCA. 
  Notifies ATC of the inhibit status. 
  Sends a lost-data message to the 
problem aircraft. 
Transmits position data via the 
APDLC. 
  
  Resumes normal operations after the 
problem aircraft lands. 
  Notifies ATC of SCA status. 
 
Aircraft With an Entry Notification and without APDLC Output: 
If the aircraft has an entry notification and subsequently loses both its ADS-B output and its APDLC 
capability, the following should occur: 
1. The AMM, noting the loss of an ADS-B signal from an aircraft (and all other output capability), 
would inhibit all new SCA operations. 
2. The AMM would notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
3. The AMM would send all aircraft a “lost signal” message via the APDLC, identifying the aircraft 
that had lost its transmission capability. 
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4. All aircraft that were conducting approach operations would revert to procedural separation using 
CTAF and continue the approach operations using their original sequence assignments. 
5. The pilot of the problem aircraft would inform ATC when they had landed using any available 
means (e.g., voice radio). 
6. Departure operations would be inhibited until the aircraft with the problem lands. 
7. A notification to the AMM that the problem aircraft has landed or has departed the SCA would be 
sent from ATC. 
The scenario sequence for this operation is shown in table 23. 
Table 23. Arriving Aircraft Without ADS-B Output and Without APDLC Output. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
All HVO Aircraft ATC AMM 
  Identified loss of ADS-B output and 
inhibits new operations into the 
SCA. 
  Notifies ATC of the inhibit status. 
  Sends a lost-data message to all 
aircraft identifying the problem 
aircraft. 
Revert to procedural separation using 
CTAF and the original approach 
sequence. 
  
Problem aircraft calls ATC after 
landing. 
  
 Receives message via telephone or 
RCO that problem aircraft has 
landed. 
 
 Send message to AMM.  
  Resumes normal operations. 
 
6.5.2 Loss of ADS-B or APDLC Output on a Departing SATS Aircraft 
Prior to conducting an SCA departure operation, aircraft would perform an ADS-B and APDLC check 
with the AMM. It is envisioned that if a successful link check could not be performed, the PA would 
inform the pilot that an HVO departure was not possible. In this instance, this departing aircraft would be 
required to revert to unequipped operations. 
6.5.3 Loss of ADS-B Input on an Arriving SATS Aircraft 
This situation would occur if an aircraft had lost the capability to receive ADS-B information from 
other SCA aircraft. If this situation takes place, the following should occur: 
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Aircraft Without an Entry Notification: 
Part of the approach sequencing process that the AMM performs is the confirmation of ADS-B state 
data input to the requesting aircraft. If the aircraft has not already been issued an arrival sequence, the 
AMM would attempt to confirm the aircraft’s ADS-B reception capability (and all other input 
capabilities) prior to the sequence notification. If there were no ADS-B inputs, the aircraft would be 
denied an entry notification. 
Aircraft With an Approach Sequence and APDLC Input: 
If the aircraft has an approach sequence and subsequently lost its ADS-B reception capability but still 
had APDLC capability, the following should occur. 
1. The aircraft with the equipment problem would notify the AMM of the loss of ADS-B reception. 
2. If all SCA aircraft were not already broadcasting their position data via APDLC, the AMM would 
request this transmission of state data via APDLC from all participating aircraft. 
3. The aircraft with the equipment problem would use the APDLC-received state data as necessary. 
The scenario sequence for this situation is shown in table 24. 
Table 24. Aircraft With Approach Sequence, With Loss of ADS-B Input, and With APDLC Input. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Problem Aircraft Other SATS HVO Aircraft AMM 
Notifies AMM of problem.   
  Requests other aircraft to broadcast 
state data via APDLC. 
 Begin broadcasting state data via 
APDLC. 
 
Receives APDLC data and continues 
operation. 
  
 
Aircraft With an Approach Sequence and without APDLC Input: 
If the aircraft has an approach sequence and subsequently loses its ADS-B input and its APDLC 
capability, the following should occur. 
1. The aircraft with the equipment failure would notify the AMM of the loss of ADS-B reception 
capability. Lack of a periodic status message via APDLC from an aircraft could also cause the 
AMM to initiate this event.  
2. The AMM would inhibit all new SCA operations. 
3. The AMM would notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
4. The AMM would send all aircraft an “unable to receive” message via the APDLC, identifying the 
aircraft that had lost its reception capability. 
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5. All aircraft conducting approach operations would revert to procedural separation using CTAF 
and continue the approach operations using their original sequencing assignments. 
6. The AMM would resume normal operations after the problem aircraft has landed. The AMM 
would then set the SCA status appropriately. 
The scenario sequence for this situation is shown in table 25. 
Table 25. Aircraft With Arrival Sequence, With Loss of ADS-B Input, and Without APDLC Input. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
All HVO Aircraft ATC AMM 
  Identifies loss of APDLC status 
message from problem aircraft. 
  Inhibits the SCA for new operations. 
  Notifies ATC of inhibit status. 
  Sends “unable to receive” message 
to all aircraft. 
Revert to procedural separation using 
prior sequence and coordinating via 
CTAF. 
  
  Resumes normal operations after 
problem aircraft lands. 
  Notifies ATC and all aircraft of 
normal operations. 
 
6.5.4 Loss of ADS-B or APDLC Input on a Departing SATS Aircraft 
Part of the departure process that the AMM performs is the confirmation of ADS-B state data input to 
the requesting aircraft. The AMM would attempt to confirm the aircraft’s ADS-B reception capability 
(and all other input capabilities). If this confirmation fails, this aircraft would be required to revert to 
unequipped operations. 
6.5.5 Loss of AMM Output 
The AMM would send a periodic operational status message to ATC and to all proximate aircraft via 
the APDLC. Loss of this operational status message would indicate a failure of the AMM. Upon loss of 
the AMM status signal, the following should occur: 
1. By default, the SCA would be inhibited from accepting any new arrival or departure operations. 
2. ATC would be informed of an AMM failure though the loss of the periodic status message from 
the AMM. 
3. ATC would not allow entries to or departures from the SCA. 
4. The aircraft would identify the AMM failure through the loss of the AMM status message. 
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5. The MFD would provide a notification to the pilot that the AMM has failed. 
6. Pilots with an assigned arrival sequence would use CTAF to corroborate their landing sequence. 
7. Pilots would close their flight plans after landing, which is both a standard ATC normal 
procedure (ref. 14) and an HVO procedure. This would provide ATC a means for correlating the 
landing aircraft with the previously retained information that identified the current SCA traffic 
aircraft. 
8. At the completion of all HVO operations, the airport would revert to non-HVO operations. 
The scenario sequence for this situation is shown in table 26. 
Table 26. Loss of AMM Output. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
All HVO Aircraft ATC AMM 
  By default, no new operations would 
be provided. 
AMM failure identified by loss of 
periodic AMM status message. 
AMM failure identified by loss of 
periodic AMM status message. 
 
Perform landing using the previously 
assigned sequence. 
Restricts any new HVO operation.  
Close flight plan with ATC.   
 Revert to non-HVO procedures 
after last SATS aircraft closes its 
flight plan. 
 
 
6.5.6 Loss of AMM Reception by a Single Aircraft 
Loss of the periodic operational status message from the AMM could indicate an APDLC receiver 
failure on the SATS aircraft. Upon loss of the AMM status message the following should occur: 
1. To confirm that the problem is single aircraft specific, the pilot of the aircraft without AMM 
reception would announce the loss of the AMM data via CTAF. If more than one aircraft has lost 
AMM reception, then the previous procedure (Loss of AMM Output) would be used. 
2. The pilots would use CTAF to corroborate their landing sequence. 
3. The aircraft would land in their original sequencing order. 
The scenario sequence for this situation is shown in table 27. 
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Table 27. Loss of AMM Reception by an Aircraft. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Problem Aircraft Other SATS HVO Aircraft AMM 
AMM or APDLC failure identified 
by loss of periodic AMM status 
message. 
  
Using CTAF, confirms loss of 
APDLC. 
  
 Confirms reception of AMM data.  
Perform landing using the previously 
assigned sequence. 
  
 
6.5.7 Loss of Voice Communications 
HVO procedures were developed for the situations when aircraft have lost their voice-radio 
communication capability. Following normal HVO procedures assures pilots of the ability to self space 
within the SCA and land according to the AMM generated sequence. For aircraft in ATC airspace, 
standard loss-of-communication procedures (ref. 14) would be used in conjunction with the HVO arrival 
procedures.  
Arriving Aircraft Outside of the SCA: 
1. ATC would use standard lost communication procedures. 
2. The lost-communications aircraft would send a “lost communications” message to the AMM via 
APDLC. 
3. The AMM would send a “lost communications” message to ATC, confirming the loss of voice 
communications. 
4. The lost-communications aircraft would be provided with a normal, non-priority approach 
sequence via APDLC, assuming that all other entry constraints were met (Sec. 5.2 and 5.3). 
5. With the exception of the lost-communications aircraft, the AMM would inhibit all new 
operations. 
6. The lost-communications aircraft should descend to the altitude immediately above the SCA at a 
time appropriate for traditional lost-communications procedures. 
7. The lost-communications aircraft would conduct normal HVO procedures. 
8. ATC would enable the AMM for new HVO operations after the lost communications aircraft has 
landed. 
9. The AMM would then resume normal operations. 
The scenario sequence for this situation is shown in table 28. 
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Table 28. Aircraft Loss of Voice Communications While Outside of the SCA. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Problem Aircraft ATC AMM 
 Uses standard lost-communications 
procedures. 
 
Sends a “lost communications” 
message to the AMM. 
  
  Sends lost communications message 
to ATC, identifying the problem 
aircraft. 
  Provides a normal approach 
sequence to the lost communications 
aircraft. 
  With the exception of the lost 
communications aircraft, inhibits the 
SCA for new operations. 
Conduct normal HVO procedures.   
 Enable the AMM for HVO after 
the problem aircraft lands 
 
 
Arriving Aircraft Inside of the SCA: 
If the aircraft had an approach sequence and subsequently lost its voice communications capability, 
normal operations would be continued. Voice-communication loss should not be a critical issue since the 
communication radio is only used as a secondary means for situation awareness and for redundancy in 
other off-nominal procedures. However, a loss-of-voice communication message should probably be sent 
to the other participating aircraft. The communication radio should be part of the minimum equipment 
requirement for initiating a SATS operation. A loss of voice communications does mean a loss of the 
CTAF environment, so transitions to VFR would have to follow existing lost-communications procedures 
(ref. 14). 
Departing Aircraft: 
 Aircraft that have lost their voice communication capability and are not airborne may not conduct an 
HVO departure. Airborne aircraft would use traditional IFR lost-communication procedures (ref. 14). 
6.6 Emergency Procedures 
6.6.1 Priority Landing Request from an Aircraft with an Approach Sequence 
This procedure would typically be used for an aircraft that is experiencing an emergency situation and 
must land immediately. This capability is valid only for aircraft that have an approach sequence assigned 
or are in a position where they would be eligible for an SCA entry notification (e.g., at the lowest 
available altitude over an SCA IAF). If they are not eligible for an SCA entry, they would coordinate 
with ATC since they are still under ATC control. Pilots within the SCA that have an emergency that 
precludes them from flying the complete instrument approach (engine or icing problems requiring an 
immediate landing) should also use these procedures. Although terrain clearance cannot be assured when 
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not flying a certified approach, these procedures would ensure that all other pilots in the vicinity would 
have awareness of the emergency and that the emergency aircraft has landing priority. 
Requesting Aircraft: 
For the aircraft requesting landing priority, the following procedure should be used: 
1. The pilot would announce the emergency and his intent over CTAF. 
2. The pilot would select the “emergency landing” feature on the MFD. 
3. The MFD would send the priority request to the AMM. 
4. The AMM would inhibit all new SCA operations.  
5. The AMM would notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
6. The AMM would send the identity of the priority aircraft to all aircraft. 
7. The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., open altitude, open 
approach) on the requesting aircraft. 
8. As soon as possible, the priority aircraft would begin the approach, procedurally spacing with 
respect to prior approach aircraft. If the approach spacing interval becomes too close, the pilot of 
the priority aircraft has the responsibility to request the preceding aircraft to perform a missed 
approach. Note that the requesting aircraft will not be assigned an approach sequence. If the 
aircraft was initially at the higher altitude at the IAF than the approach altitude, this aircraft 
should only begin a normal descent (e.g., 500 foot-per-minute descent rate) after crossing the IAF 
inbound on the approach. 
Other SCA Aircraft: 
1. The aircraft symbol on the MFD for the priority aircraft would be highlighted. 
2. Arriving aircraft that are already on the approach would continue with the approach procedure. If 
the emergency aircraft requests that the approach path needs to be immediately cleared for the 
emergency operation, these aircraft should execute an early missed-approach climb. 
3. If the priority aircraft was already on the approach or was the first aircraft in holding at an IAF 
(e.g., the next aircraft to initiate the approach), the AMM would not re-sequence the other 
aircraft. Otherwise, the AMM would re-sequence the aircraft waiting for an approach in their 
original order, excluding the priority aircraft.  
4. The AMM would send the new sequence information to all aircraft. 
5. The MFD would notify the appropriate pilots of their re-sequence assignments. 
6. The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., open altitude, open 
approach) until the pilot of the re-sequenced aircraft acknowledged the re-sequence. 
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7. The MFD would inhibit all approach-operations PA messages (e.g., open approach) until the 
priority aircraft has landed. 
8. Once the priority aircraft has landed, normal operations would be resumed. 
The sequence for this situation is shown in table 29 and an example of this procedure is shown in 
figures 23 and 28. This procedure is further examined in ref. 15. 
Table 29. Priority Landing Request for An Aircraft With an Approach Sequence. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Problem Aircraft Other SATS HVO Aircraft AMM 
Announces problem over CTAF.   
Selects “emergency landing” on the 
MFD. 
  
MFD inhibits all continuing-
operations PA messages. 
 Inhibits the SCA for new operations. 
  Notifies ATC of inhibit status. 
  Sends identification of priority 
aircraft to all aircraft. 
 Priority aircraft highlighted on 
MFD. 
 
Conducts approach.  Re-sequences aircraft. 
 If re-sequenced, all continuing-
operations PA messages are 
inhibited until pilot acknowledges 
the re-sequence. 
 
 OPEN APPROACH messages 
inhibited until priority aircraft 
lands. 
 
  Resumes normal operations after 
problem aircraft lands. 
  Notifies ATC and all aircraft of 
normal operations. 
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Figure 28.  Example of a re-sequencing for a priority landing request. 
6.6.2 Priority Landing Request from a Departing Aircraft 
This procedure was designed to support a departing aircraft that is unable to continue the departure 
operation and must return for an instrument approach to the airport. 
Requesting Aircraft: 
Note that the first 7 steps of this procedure are the same as for Priority Landing Request from an 
Aircraft with an Approach Sequence. 
1. The pilot would announce the emergency and his intent over CTAF. 
2. The pilot would select the “emergency landing” feature on the MFD. 
3. The MFD would send the priority request via APDLC to the AMM. 
4. The AMM would inhibit all new SCA operations. 
5. The AMM would notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status and identify the priority aircraft. 
6. The AMM would send the identity of the priority aircraft to all aircraft. 
7. The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., open altitude, open 
approach). 
8. As soon as possible, the priority aircraft would proceed to either IAF, at the lowest altitude, and 
begin the approach, procedurally spacing with respect to prior approach aircraft (if any). Note that 
this aircraft would not be assigned an approach sequence. If the approach spacing interval 
becomes too close, the pilot of the priority aircraft has the responsibility to request the preceding 
aircraft to perform a missed approach.  
Re-sequenced 
aircraft 
  48
Other SCA Aircraft: 
1. The aircraft symbol on the MFD for the priority aircraft would be highlighted. 
2. Arriving aircraft that are already on the approach would continue with the approach procedure. If 
the emergency aircraft needs the approach path immediately cleared, the pilot of the emergency 
aircraft would request that the preceding aircraft execute an early missed-approach. 
3. Arrival aircraft that are holding at the IAF (i.e., not already on the approach) and are at the lowest 
altitude would be re-sequenced, if necessary, such that they would leave the IAF for the approach 
as soon as possible (i.e., the intent is to make a clear approach path for the emergency aircraft). 
These aircraft should make every attempt to expedite their approach operations. 
4. For arrival aircraft that are holding at the IAF (i.e., not already on the approach) and are not at the 
lowest altitude, the following should occur: 
- These aircraft would be re-sequenced, as required, for the approach. 
- If the aircraft had an approach sequence that was changed (i.e., re-sequenced), the MFD would 
notify the SATS pilot to the changes in the approach information (e.g., new leading aircraft or 
MAHF). 
- These aircraft would be given a STANDBY notification by the AMM.  
- The MFD would notify the appropriate pilots of their standby assignment.  
- The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., open altitude, open 
approach) until the pilot of the re-sequenced aircraft acknowledges the re-sequence. 
- The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., open altitude, open 
approach) until the emergency aircraft lands. 
5. Normal operations would be resumed once the priority aircraft has landed. 
The sequence for this situation is shown in table 30. This procedure is further examined in ref. 15. 
  49
Table 30. Priority Landing Request for a Departing Aircraft. 
 
 Sequence of Events  
Problem Aircraft Other SATS HVO Aircraft AMM 
Announces problem over CTAF.   
Selects “emergency landing” on 
MFD. 
  
MFD inhibits all continuing-
operations PA messages. 
 Inhibits the SCA for new operations. 
  Notifies ATC of inhibit status. 
  Sends identification of priority 
aircraft to all aircraft. 
 Priority aircraft highlighted on 
MFD. 
 
Proceed to the IAF at the lowest 
available altitude and conduct the 
approach. 
 Re-sequences holding aircraft to 
provide a path for the priority 
aircraft. 
 If re-sequenced, all continuing-
operations PA messages are 
inhibited until pilot acknowledges 
the re-sequence. 
 
 If the aircraft is to clear the path 
for the priority aircraft, expedite 
the approach in the sequence order. 
Otherwise, OPEN APPROACH 
messages are inhibited until the 
priority aircraft lands. 
 
  Resumes normal operations after 
problem aircraft lands. 
  Notifies ATC and all aircraft of 
normal operations. 
 
An example of this procedure is shown in figures 29-32, with the chosen example portraying the worst 
approach sequencing situation prior to the start of this procedure. Figure 29 shows the start of this 
procedure, with an aircraft on the approach and three other aircraft waiting to begin the approach. The 
approach sequence numbers are shown in this figure for these aircraft.  
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Figure 29. Example of a priority landing request from a departing aircraft: initial situation. 
Figure 30 portrays the situation immediately after the departing aircraft makes the priority request. At 
this point, the AMM would have re-sequenced the aircraft, issued the new sequence numbers and, where 
appropriate, STANDBY notifications. Note that the action by the AMM has affected all of the holding 
aircraft.  
Figure 31 shows the situation as the second aircraft begins its approach. Note that the standard HVO 
airborne tools, using the AMM sequencing information, have provided the information to the second 
aircraft that it is safe to initiate its approach. Also note that the first aircraft has landed. 
Figure 32 shows the situation after the third aircraft begins its approach, again using its onboard tools 
to determine when to begin the approach. Figure 33 is a plan-view graphic of the situation shown in 
figure 32. 
Figure 30. Example of a priority landing request from a departing aircraft: after re-sequence. 
Aircraft #3 
Aircraft #2 
Aircraft #4 
Aircraft #1 
Aircraft 
requesting priority 
STANDBY 
Aircraft #2 
Aircraft #3 
Aircraft #1 
Aircraft 
requesting priority 
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Figure 31. Example of a priority landing request from a departing aircraft: aircraft #2 begins approach. 
Figure 32. Example of a priority landing request from a departing aircraft: aircraft #3 begins approach. 
Figure 33. Plan-view of the situation of figure 32. 
Figure 34 shows the situation as the priority aircraft begins its approach. Note that while the standard 
HVO airborne tools have provided the information to the third aircraft to initiate its approach, the pilot of 
the priority aircraft, because of the emergency situation, will initiate the approach as soon as possible. 
Also note that if the approach spacing interval becomes too close, the pilot of the priority aircraft has the 
responsibility to request the preceding aircraft to perform a missed approach. 
Aircraft #2 
STANDBY 
Aircraft #3 Aircraft 
requesting priority 
Aircraft #2 
STANDBY 
Aircraft #3 
Aircraft 
requesting priority 
Aircraft #2 
STANDBY 
Aircraft #3 
Aircraft 
requesting priority 
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Figure 34. Example of a priority landing request from a departing aircraft: priority: aircraft begins approach. 
Once the priority aircraft has landed, the STANDBY aircraft will be allowed to resume approach 
operations. Also note that all normal operations would be resumed once the priority aircraft has landed. 
7.0 Summary 
This paper outlines the SATS HVO concept, which allows the operation of multiple small aircraft 
during periods of poor weather at virtually any small airport. This operational concept offers a unique 
opportunity for revolutionary transportation growth and passenger convenience. The SATS HVO concept 
would allow simultaneous operations by multiple aircraft to take place in the non-radar airspace around 
airports with no tower and limited or no radar services. Aircraft operating in this airspace would need 
special avionics to participate, most likely including near-term technologies, such as ADS-B and a 
communications data link, and appropriate self-separation tools. This concept would also require a new, 
relatively simple ground-based automation system that would provide appropriate sequencing 
information to the arriving aircraft. Although pilot and controller workload issues were not investigated 
experimentally for this concept definition, they were considered in the development of these new 
procedures, with the aim of minimizing the potential for additional workload requirements.  
This paper also included descriptions of off-nominal situations that could be expected to occur in a 
future SATS environment. The situations that were examined were segregated into four categories: 
routine, such as a change of landing approach direction; procedural deviations, such as flying to the 
wrong MAHF; equipment malfunctions, such as a loss of an aircraft’s communication system; and 
emergency situations, such as a priority request for an emergency landing. SATS operational procedures 
were developed to accommodate these off-nominal situations and were described in this paper. 
Additionally, since both equipment requirements and equipment malfunctions are closely interrelated in 
off-nominal situations, a candidate implementation scheme (i.e., display format and data links) was also 
presented. 
This proposed operational concept emphasizes integration with the current and planned near-term 
NAS (ref. 16). The focus of the underlying design approach was on simplicity from both a procedural and 
a systems requirements standpoint. This is in keeping with the SATS goal of achieving a realistic, 
operationally deployable system for the 2010 timeframe. The development focus was on providing an 
operational concept that was safe, would enable more than one operation at a time, and would not require 
significant ground infrastructure costs or improvements. A significant design effort was also expended 
towards minimizing equipment requirements and changes to today’s operating rules. The concept is 
based on a distributed decision-making environment that would provide pilots the necessary procedures, 
STANDBY 
Aircraft #3 
Aircraft 
requesting priority 
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tools, and information to enable safe operations within the SCA, noting that while this is a distributed 
decision-making environment, the majority of the decision-making responsibility would remain with the 
pilot. 
The operational concepts and procedures described in this paper were intended to provide a foundation 
for additional designs and analyses. Operational concepts such as the one proposed in the fundamental 
SATS HVO concept documents and expanded here could enhance the opportunity for point-to-point air 
taxi or charter operations into smaller airports, providing greater convenience to the traveling public. 
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Appendix A  
SCA Procedures for Alternative Instrument Approach Designs 
General 
The general approach procedures for SCA operations can potentially be adapted for situations when 
the instrument approach procedure differs from the basic GPS T approach previously described. In 
considering alternative instrument approach designs in the SCA procedures, the following guidelines 
were used: 
- The missed approach segment of the instrument approach procedure may not place the aircraft on a 
reciprocal path to the final approach course unless vertical separation can be assured. 
- No more than two IAFs may be used for the instrument approach procedure. This restriction is based 
on the ability to efficiently and safely land the arriving aircraft, limiting the arrival operations to four 
aircraft. This four aircraft maximum is achieved with two aircraft at each IAF. 
- The IAFs must have sufficient horizontal separation such that the protected areas for each of the 
respective holding patterns do not overlap. 
- IAFs may not lie along a common path. That is, one IAF may not be on the approach path of the other 
IAF. 
If the previous conditions can be met for an approach procedure with two IAFs, then the general SATS 
HVO procedures may be used. 
Single IAF 
For instrument approach procedures where only one IAF is possible, the SCA operating rules are 
modified as follows: 
- No more than two concurrent arrival operations are allowed in the SCA. 
- Since alternating MAHFs cannot be given to sequential aircraft, an additional separation buffer (e.g., 
adding an additional time to the following aircraft’s spacing interval assuming similar aircraft speeds) 
should be given each following aircraft to provide a safety margin in the case that two sequential 
aircraft perform missed approach operations.  
- All other SCA operating rules remain the same. 
If these conditions can be met for an approach procedure with one IAF, then the remaining general 
SATS HVO procedures may be used. Example approach charts with one IAF are provided in figures A1 
and A2. Also note that the lateral entry area would be modified with a single entry area (figure A3). 
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Figure A1. Example approach chart with single IAF. 
 
 
Missed Approach:  Climb to 2000’ then climbing 
right turn to 3000’ via LNAV path to UCGEL and 
hold. 
SATS RNAV (GPS) RWY
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Rwy ldg 4999
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APP CRS
034 0
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(MAF and 
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SATS RNAV (GPS) RWY
MELFA/ACCOMACK COUNTY (MFV) 
MELFA, VIRGINIA
MELFA, VIRGINIA
SATS Equipped Only
GPS or RNP-0.3 required
DME/DME RNP .3 NA 
CIRCLING NA
440-1 1/4  
393 (400-1 1/4)
C D
4.5 NM
SATS Self 
Controlled 
Area 264.
515.
349.
331 + .
Research Only – Not for Navigation
0340 TO
RWY 3
TDZE
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 X
 1
00
REIL Rwys 3 and 21 L
MIRL Rwy 3-21 L
ELEV 47
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143.
.
. 136 +
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1500
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CATEGORY
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Figure A2. Example approach chart with single, off-final IAF. 
 
Missed Approach:  Climbing right turn to lowest 
available (2000 or 3000) via LNAV path to AZBEJ 
and hold. 
SATS RNAV (GPS) RWY 3 AZBEJ
MELFA/ACCOMACK COUNTY (MFV) 
124o
304o
15
00
03
4o
(5
)
2000304o(5)
Rwy ldg 4999
TDZE      47
Apt Elev 47
APP CRS
034 0
AWOS-3
118.175
NORFOLK APP CON
126.05
JAGNO
AZBEJ
JAGNO   
(MAF and 
Threshold)
MELFA   
(FAF)
(IAF) 
AZBEJ   
(IF) 
UCGEL   
SATS RNAV (GPS) RWY 3 AZBEJ
MELFA/ACCOMACK COUNTY (MFV) 
MELFA, VIRGINIA
MELFA, VIRGINIA
SATS Equipped Only
GPS or RNP-0.3 required
DME/DME RNP .3 NA 
MELFA
UCGEL
2000
1500
0340
3.000
TCH 40
CATEGORY
LNAV MDA
CIRCLING NA
440-1  393 (400-1) 440-1 1/4  
393 (400-1 1/4)
A B C D
5 NM 4.5 NM 0340 TO
RWY 3
TDZE
47
50
04
 X
 1
00
REIL Rwys 3 and 21 L
MIRL Rwy 3-21 L
ELEV 47
127 +
143.
.
. 136 +
SATS Self 
Controlled 
Area 264.
515.
349.
331 + .
374 .
3000
2000
Research Only – Not for Navigation
UNICOM
122.8 (CTAF) L
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Figure A3. Lateral entry area for the single IAF approach shown in figure A1. Note that the yellow area extends 
outside of the circle. 
MAHF not Co-Located with the IAF 
For instrument approach procedures where, for operational reasons, the MAHF cannot be co-located 
with the IAF, an alternative SCA design with a complementary approach procedure may be possible. 
Figure A4 shows one example for this alternative design where the IAF, AZBEJ, cannot be used for the 
MAHF due to a 914ft obstacle between the missed approach point and AZBEJ. To employ this 
alternative design, the following constraints would apply: 
- The MAHF and its protected area must be within the SCA. 
- The missed approach segment of the instrument approach procedure may not place the aircraft on 
conflicting course for the instrument approach procedure unless vertical separation can be assured. 
- The MAHF and the IAFs must have sufficient horizontal separation such that the protected areas for 
each of the respective holding patterns do not overlap. 
The procedures for SCA entry would be changed such that: 
- Entries are not allowed at an IAF if any aircraft is on the approach and the MAHF for that approach is 
assigned as their MAHF. The AMM would count the aircraft assigned to the MAHF as also assigned 
to the appropriate IAF. 
- Entries may not result in the assignment of more than two aircraft to a specific fix, with the 
assignment as either an IAF or as the IAF following the MAHF.  
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Pilots assigned this MAHF and conducting a missed approach would be expected to fly to the MAHF, 
climb in the holding pattern until reaching the minimum altitude for the holding pattern, and then proceed 
to the IAF. Once the aircraft initiated the missed approach, the AMM would assign a new approach 
sequence using the standard HVO procedures. 
Figure A4. Example approach chart with MAHF separate from the IAF. 
Missed Approach:  Climbing right turn to 2000’ to 
AWXYZ. 
SATS RNAV (GPS) RWY 3 AWXYZ
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Appendix B  
Conflict Detection and Alerting 
A multilayer approach to the prevention of conflicts due to the loss of aircraft-to-aircraft separation is 
an explicit part of the SATS HVO design with these operations relying on both procedures and onboard 
automation. This multilayer approach gives pilots support and guidance during the execution of normal 
operations and advance warning in case of procedure deviations or off-nominal operations. These pilot 
procedures were designed to be both simple and robust. They have been formally proven to provide safe 
separation to approaching and departing aircraft in the SCA (ref. 17). Adherence to these procedures 
represents the first layer of this multilayer method. A second layer is provided by the procedure support 
automation that includes onboard conformance monitoring, approach spacing, and altitude determination 
tools. The conformance monitoring tool advises pilots of altitude, speed, and path deviations during all 
approach segments and holding patterns. The spacing tool provides in-trail approach initiation time and 
spacing advisories. The altitude determination tool identifies open holding altitudes within the SCA. The 
third layer in this conflict prevention strategy is provided by the aircraft-based Conflict Detection and 
Alerting (CD&A) logic which is also part of the onboard automation. To address cases of procedure 
deviations or off-nominal conditions, a CD&A method was developed that uses a combination of state 
vector and procedure-based intent for conflict detection and a multistage, asymmetrical alerting system. 
A schematic view of the SATS HVO multilayer conflict prevention approach is depicted in figure B1. 
The different layers are logically independent. 
Figure B1. Schematic view of the SATS conflict prevention process. 
Procedure 
Separation 
Procedure 
Support 
Conflict 
Detection and 
Alerting 
AMM
M
M
M
M
Proven safe procedures provide separation to participating aircraft 
Pilots are advised of path, altitude and speed deviations and get in-trail 
spacing advisories 
MFD 
MFD 
Pilots are advised of potential loss of separation conflicts through a 
hierarchical alerting system 
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The CD&A logic was designed to provide conflict awareness to aircraft within the SCA during off-
nominal conditions such as procedure deviations and emergency operations. The CD&A logic is based on 
a hybrid method that uses a combination of both ADS-B state vector and intent information to predict any 
loss of separation while minimizing false alarms. The method uses the concept of Nominal Approach 
Path (NAP) conformance as part of the prediction logic. The NAP represents the implicit intent. An 
aircraft is in conformance to the NAP if the following conditions are satisfied: 
- Aircraft enters the SCA according to the information received from the AMM, performing either a 
lateral or vertical entry. 
- Aircraft remains within the lateral and vertical boundaries of the approach containment volume (a 
configurable lateral distance and altitude error that limits the accepted deviation of an aircraft from its 
nominal trajectory) for all segments of the approach, missed approach and holding patterns. 
- Aircraft remains within its intended speed profile during all the approach segments.  
- Aircraft performs a missed approach according to the assigned MAHF. 
A pair-wise conflict detection logic selects state-based or NAP-based trajectory projections for the 
ownship (from a pilot’s perspective, the aircraft that they are flying) and traffic aircraft depending on 
their conformance status. A NAP-based projection is used for conforming aircraft whereas a state-based 
projection is used for non-conforming aircraft. The rational for this hybrid trajectory prediction technique 
is that an aircraft in path conformance is more likely to follow the intended path. No assumptions should 
be made for non-conforming aircraft. For conforming aircraft, the hybrid conflict detection logic behaves 
as a purely intent based logic. This is a key feature to reduce false alarms that otherwise could frequently 
occur in terminal areas. False alarms can have an adverse effect on pilots in that they may ultimately 
ignore real conflicts. Preliminary simulation studies have shown that this hybrid approach outperforms 
state based only methods with regards to false and missed alerts. In addition, the technique has been 
successfully implemented and used in simulations and flight tests with very low incidence of false alerts 
during these tests. 
The pair-wise conflict detection logic selects either a state or NAP based path propagation technique 
for each aircraft according to its conformance status. For an aircraft in conformance, the path propagation 
is based on its implicit intent along the approach, departure, or missed approach path. For an aircraft out 
of conformance, the path propagation is based on its state vector since no assumption should be made for 
an aircraft that deviates from procedure. The conflict detection logic may select different propagation 
techniques for ownship and the other aircraft. Once the selection is done, potential trajectories are 
generated and geometric conflicts are evaluated. Figure B2 shows a functional description of the 
algorithm.   
The conflict alerting algorithm developed for SATS HVO employs a multi-stage, asymmetrical 
alerting scheme. Multilevel refers to the use of three levels of alerts: advisories, cautions and warnings; 
which are based upon the time to conflict. Asymmetrical alerting involves selecting the order and time in 
which pilots are notified of an impeding conflict based on a pair-wise inherently simultaneous conflict 
detection. While two aircraft running the conflict detection algorithm can detect a conflict simultaneously, 
the time at which pilots are alerted can be delayed depending on certain conditions. In particular this 
alerting method permits a conflicting aircraft that is out of conformance to be notified first so it can make 
trajectory and speed adjustments to correct its course before the conforming aircraft is notified. The same 
logic can be applied to trailing aircraft on approach, that if notified first can make speed adjustments to 
  63
avert potential conflicts. Resolution advisories to potential loss of separation conflicts are not automated 
in the current system and are part of on going research.  
Figure B2. Conflict detection logic. 
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Appendix C  
Simplified Flow Charts of Normal Arrival and Departure Procedures 
A simplified flow chart of the normal arrival procedure is provided in figure C1. The departure 
procedure is provided in figure C2. 
Figure C1. Arrival procedure. 
Pilot sends AMM an 
Entry Request 
Pilot informs ATC, descends into 
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Figure C2. Departure procedure. 
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